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L’objet de ce papier est d’utiliser une approche en terme de théorie des jeux afin d’étudier les questions 
d’harmonisation ou de compétition fiscale au sein d’une union monétaire. Plus spécifiquement, cette étude 
concerne l’Union économique et monétaire et le risque de « guerre d’usure ». Les arguments traditionnels 
sont d’une part que sans harmonisation, des comportements de « free-riding » peuvent apparaître, menant 
à un équilibre sous optimal en matière de politique fiscale, et d’autre part que la compétition peut aussi 
être à l’origine de problèmes importants en matière d’équilibre budgétaire. Mais l’autonomie fiscale a un 
avantage majeur. Lorsque la politique monétaire n’est plus du ressort des pays et lorsque la politique 
budgétaire est contrainte par le Pacte de stabilité et de croissance, l’instrument fiscal devient le dernier 
outil macro-économique à la disposition des gouvernements pour absorber les chocs asymétriques. Le 
modèle proposé est construit sous deux horizons. Si l’horizon est fini, les conclusions traditionnelles de la 
littérature en faveur de l’harmonisation sont représentées. Avec un  horizon infini, les joueurs prennent en 
compte les coûts de dévier et d’entrer dans une guerre d’usure. La coordination apparaît alors sans qu’il y 




The purpose of this paper is to use a game theoretical approach to analyze tax harmonization, or 
competition, in a monetary union, more specifically in Europe. Without harmonization, free-riding 
behaviors may appear, leading to a sub-optimal tax equilibrium. Tax competition may also create 
budgetary problems and the objective of a balanced budget may not be attained. But national tax 
autonomy has one main advantage: as monetary policy is “federalized”, and as fiscal policy is constrained 
by the Stability and Growth Pact, taxation becomes the last macroeconomic instrument within 
governments’ hands to deal with asymmetric shocks.  The literature often condemns tax autonomy  
because of possible free-riding behaviors. In such a case, the competition could conduct to the lowest tax 
rate of all countries, condemning others to diminish their public spending.  But, this analysis rests on a 
static point of view: In that case, harmonization with strict rules is Pareto-optimum. In the dynamic case, 
as harmonization costs are not incurred, the final equilibrium may be of a higher welfare level. 
Coordination would occur without the need for strict rules. If countries maintain sound public finance, tax 
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On November 5th, 1997, in its Report: “Measures to fight against tax competition in 
the European Union” (European Commission, Bull. 6-1997) the European Commission 
recommended a coordinated action against tax competition in Europe, the objective being 
to reduce distortions still existing within the Single market, to avoid losses on tax receipts 
and to establish tax structures more in favor of employment. The Ecofin Council of 
December 1
st, 1997 gave its assent on the resolution relating to a code of conduct in the 
field of companies taxation, and approved the idea of tax harmonization on savings. In 
June 2000 the European Council finally agreed on a compromise on taxes on savings. 
European countries will have to inform other countries about savings made by residents 
from other member states. Yet, a transition period of 7 years is established whereby a 
minimum common tax rate of 15% until 2004, then 20% until the end of 2009 will apply. 
How to evaluate the economic rationale of this type of measure ? 
The literature on tax competition
1 studies either the impact on multinational firms 
(Wilson, 1987) or is interested in a more macroeconomic point of view: the influence on 
governments’ strategic behaviors (Wildasin, 1986). 
From a microeconomic point of view, international tax competition does exist with 
respect to multinational corporations (Wildasin, 1993; Rasmussen, 1997). Considerable 
anecdotal evidence for tax competition is found, for example, in recent German 
experience (Weichenrieder, 1996). While several other countries lowered corporate tax 
rates or introduced special tax incentives for some kinds of corporate income, Germany’s 
high taxes have seemingly induced multinationals to shift at least the more mobile part of 
their tax base abroad. 
 
1 Existing definitions of tax competition may be found in Oates (1972) and Wildasin (1986) 4 
 
From a macroeconomic point of view, European Monetary Union (EMU) raises the 
question of tax competition between member states. Individual countries face the 
following twin objectives: achieving budget equilibrium in the medium term (the 
Stability and Growth Pact - SGP) and high employment (or growth) through a 
competitive taxation policy. 
If each country’s tax policy is independent of the others, free riding behaviors may 
exist. A sub-optimal tax equilibrium for the monetary zone as a whole may occur. Tax 
competition may also create budgetary problems and the objective of a balanced budget 
may not be attained. Lopez, Marchand and Pestieau (1996) show that fiscal competition 
leads to under-provision of public good or inefficient redistribution. 
Finally, the literature generally considers that tax competition could trigger a “race to 
the bottom”, i.e., lead to too low a tax rate (the lowest of all member states). Countries 
would then have to diminish their public spending insofar as tax receipts would decrease. 
Facing these problems, several papers insisted on the necessity and the gains of 
coordination, that is to say tax harmonization (Razin and Sadka, 1991; van Ypersele, 
1998; Holmlund and Kolm, 1999). But harmonization may require some conditions 
(Cremer and Gahvari, 2000), and this coordination mechanism may take several forms: 
from a central fiscal authority (Cardarelli, Taugourdeau and Vidal, 1999) to a capital 
control mechanism (Rasmussen, 1997).  
 But, is tax harmonization really the best way to deal with this problem? 
True, without harmonization, as said above, free-riding behaviors may appear, leading 
to a sub-optimal tax equilibrium. But national tax autonomy has one main advantage: as 
monetary policy is “federalized”, and as fiscal policy is constrained by the Stability and 
Growth Pact, taxation becomes the last macroeconomic instrument within governments’ 
hands to deal with asymmetric shocks. 
Moreover, if  tax rates are cut, and if government expenditures have to be reduced as a 
consequence, could not that help reduce waste and inefficiencies in the public sector? In 
addition, tax competition might help to establish better tax systems, and every country   5 
   
 
could learn from the experiences of others. In contrast, tax harmonization could result in 
higher average taxes in the European union (Boss, 1999). 
Another point: the idea that tax competition could lead to “too low” a tax rate and to a 
decrease in public spending rests on a static point of view. 
Within a static game, possible free riding behaviors may lead to a sub-optimal 
equilibrium; the Pareto-optimal equilibrium would then require a cooperation 
mechanism, i.e., harmonization. In a dynamic analysis the final equilibrium may be of a 
higher welfare level than the static one. Indeed, conducting a policy of harmonization 
with strict rules is not without cost, whereas the “natural” coordination resulting from the 
dynamic case does not require any of these costs. The signals given by each player may 
be sufficient to lead to a long term cooperative equilibrium. 
The model of this paper is based on a game between two European governments. This 
approach is very fruitful insofar as it incorporates interactions between member states in 
the conduct of their taxation policies. 
Each government follows tax and unemployment objectives. The game is played both 
within a short term horizon and within an infinite one. The model rests upon a formal 
analysis of the relationship between both governments seeking to maximize employment 
under a budget constraint. The short term approach favors the need for tax harmonization 
in order to lead to a stable system. The infinite approach, through the threat of 
government’s reprisals following a non-anticipated decrease in taxes from the other 
government, underlines the role of tax competition to reach stability of the system. 
The theoretical analysis sheds light on the paramount importance of taxation in 
Europe, and, more generally, in a monetary union. It demonstrates the need for a system 
that would, at the same time, allow to deal with asymmetric shocks while avoiding free 
riding behaviors. It leads also to an institutional analysis of the tax system in the EMU as 
well as to policy recommendations.  
The mechanism leading to this type of stability under a tax competition regime, rests 
on the impact of the signal given by both players.  If a country gives the signal that 6 
 
“friendly” taxation behavior is not its priority, the result can be a war of attrition 
(Fourçans & Warin, 2001). Conversely, if both countries signal their ability to conduct 
such a war, this war will not occur. And the stability of the system will be ensured. One 
measure of this ability is the total tax rate. The higher it is, the higher is the probability 
that the country would not be able to engage in a war  of attrition. 
2. ASSUMPTIONS OF THE MODEL 
The Economic Union consists of two independent countries producing an 
homogeneous good using capital and labor. Each country has a fixed amount of immobile 
labor and a fixed endowment of capital per worker. Technologies are identical in both 
countries and exhibit constant returns to scale. Capital flows freely between member 
states to equalize after tax returns. Cooperative tax policies may imply that the tax 
authorities jointly determine tax rates in the two countries.
2 
2.1 The structure of the economy 
As the trigger strategies are not taken into account, the governments cannot improve 
their reputation during the game. 
The taxation rate used in the model is taken as a weighted average of all the country 
rates.  
In the short run it is considered that an unexpected decrease in one country’s taxation 
rate relative to the other country, decreases unemployment in the former country. If  i t  is 
the ratio of the change in one country tax rate compared to the other country’s change, 
the unemployment rate in both countries is given by: 
( )
e
i i i u u t t b - - = . , i=1, 2, (1) 
 
2 The precise form of cooperation depends on the institutional features of the bargaining process between the 
tax authorities. The form of cooperation actually materializing is beyond the scope of the present paper.   7 
   
 
where u  is the equilibrium unemployment rate and 
e
i t  the expected relative change 
of the tax rate in country i, with i=1, 2.  0   and     <
e
i i t t , we consider the case where 
countries are willing to decrease taxes. This assumption is relevant with the competition 
case study. 
2.2 Players’ objectives 
Both players have the following loss functions (Barro and Gordon, 1983): 
2 2 ) ( ) ( i i i u L t a + = , i=1, 2, (2) 
where a³0 introduces the relative weight of the two partial objectives. A high a 
implies that a given player gives more importance to tax stability than to unemployment. 
And conversely for a low a. Alpha equals one means that the player gives the same 
importance to both objectives. 
By substituting eq. 1 into eq. 2, the loss functions become: 
2 2 ) ( )) ( ( i
e
i i i u L t a t t b + - - =  (3) 
2.3 Players’ strategies  
Two strategies are possible : the “hawk” and the “dove”. In the first case, player 1 
reacts to a previously unexpected decrease of the other country’s rate by a non-
announced decrease of his own rate in the following period in order to mislead the other’s 
expectations. In the second case, the first player does not react to an unexpected 
depreciation of the other tax rate and does not try to mislead expectations. 8 
 
3. ONE SHOT GAME WITH A FINITE HORIZON  
The one shot game is played within a complete information framework. Each player 
knows the strategies of the other as well as the payments. Three occurrences are then 
possible. 
3.1 The generalized “dove” strategy  
In this case, neither player tries to mislead the other’s expectations, i.e. does not try to 
follow a policy that would lead to a depreciation of his own rate. In the model, this means 
0 = i t  and  0 =
e
i t . 
Both “dove” loss functions become : 
2 /
1 ) (u L
D D =  and 
2 /
2 ) (u L
D D = .  (4) 
3.2 One country’s hawk strategy 
In that case, one country decides to upset the other’s expectations. If country 1 is the 
“hawk” country then  0 1 =
e t , but  1 t  must be positive in order to minimize the loss 






1 ) ( ) ( t a bt + - = u L
D H , (5) 
which is minimized with : 







By substitution, the loss function becomes :   9 











D H . (7) 
As far as the second country is concerned,  0 2 = t , and  0 2 =















H D . (8) 
3.3 The generalized " hawk " strategy  
The game being played with perfect information, each player knows the other’s 


































Each  policy being expected by both players means that : t1
e=t2 and t2
e=t1. 










= 2 .  (10) 
This result shows a “bias” towards a decrease in taxes from both countries, even 
though they do not improve their unemployment rate which remains at the structural 
































Both of these functions are higher than those of the “dove” strategy. 
3.4 The equilibrium strategy of the game 
The results can be presented in the following matrix form. 
 
Table 2.  Matrix representation of strategies and results 
  Second country: Dove 
t2= 0 
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With a one shot game, the cooperative behavior (“dove”) is dominated by the non-
cooperative behavior (“hawk”)
3. The only equilibrium for both players is not to cooperate 
and therefore to follow the “hawk” strategy : the (H, H) solution. This is a traditional 
result of the prisoner’s dilemma. 
The process implies that the only sub-game perfect equilibrium is when both players 
do not cooperate at each period. However, as Selten (1978) pointed out, it could appear 
interesting to cooperate. The two players could prefer to agree and play the (D, D) 
strategy which leads to a better payment for both of them. Yet, if one decides to play 
“dove”, it becomes interesting for the other to play “hawk” (cf. table 2).  As a main 
result, both will play (H, H), that is to say the sub-optimal strategy. 
The optimal Pareto combination is (D, D). But, this strategy is only possible if both 
countries agree on a bilateral contract aiming at a stable tax rate. Otherwise, the dominant 
strategy is the discrete one, i.e. (H, H). 
4. THE REPEATED GAME WITH AN INFINITE HORIZON 
Here, the prisoner’s dilemma situation cum a repeated game with an infinite horizon 
or a finite one with a sufficiently distant last period is considered. In that case, the Kreps 
and Wilson (1982) approach can be used and the game is played with imperfect 
information. As the “hawk” versus “dove” strategy with a possible penalty (unexpected 
tax decrease) are compared, the “folk theorem” can be used, as well with an infinite 
horizon as with a finite but sufficiently distant one (Benoit and Krishna, 1985; Friedman, 
1985). 
 
3 See appendix. 12 
 
4.1 The players’ possible choices 
The gains or costs of distorting the other player’s expectations are evaluated with 


















In a one period game, if the optimal Pareto solution (D, D) is chosen, the above 
results are obtained. If player 1 plays “hawk” and player 2 plays “dove”, player 1, 
instead of loosing  























u . (13) 










With a multiple periods game, things may change. Player 2 is able to punish 
player 1 in the following periods. Player 2 gains if he plays “hawk” and player 1 
plays “dove” in the following period. And player 2 looses less if player 1 plays 
“hawk”. Yet, the latest solution brings about a loss compared to the optimal   13 
   
 
Pareto situation. 
It is therefore interesting for both players to minimize the number of periods 
where the results are sub-optimal. Player 1 must quickly establish his credibility if 
he does not want to loose continually through the (H, H) strategy, where the loss 
is : 













Given this information, both players decide on the duration of the conflict and thereby 
on their strategies. 
Table 3.  Matrix representation of the profits and losses 
  Second country: Dove 
t2= 0 







































































































4.2 Equilibrium with infinite horizon 
A player plays “dove” if the gains resulting from the “hawk” strategy played at one 
period are lower than the present value of losses of the penalty decided by player 2
4 : 






d Losses (16) 
where d = (1+R)
-1 < 1 is the present value factor and R, the real interest rate. A low 
d means that the player does not exploit the penalty strategy for too long a period.  After 
































If T* is the period where the player can be indifferent between the “hawk” or “dove” 















.  (19) 
When T > T*, the present value of losses is higher than the gains from the “hawk” 
strategy. The latter will therefore not be adopted.  When T < T*, the gains from the 
 
4 This method is inspired by Solow (1990).   15 
   
 
“hawk” strategy are higher than the present value of losses. This strategy will therefore 






















< f(T,d). (20) 
 For illustration purposes, f(T,d) can be drawn with d = 0,98 (meaning R equals 2 %). 







.  (21) 
When a = 0 (the loss function depends only of the unemployment rate), g = 0. When 
a = 1 (the same weight is given to unemployment and to the change in the tax rate in 
the loss function), 
2 2) 1 (
1
b b +












When player 1 addresses a signal that he gives more and more weight to unemployment 
rather than to the tax rate (a decreases), the penalty period decided by player 2 becomes 
shorter and shorter. When less and less weight is given by player 1 to unemployment, the 
second player’s penalty period increases. 
5. POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
The proposed model has some main policy implications. In the one shot game, an 
optimal Pareto solution can only be obtained if both players mutually agree not to disrupt 
each other’s expectations on the tax rate. 
In the infinite horizon situation, things are somewhat different. It is in the interest of 
each player to address a clear and strong signal to the other about its own strategy. In 
other words, it is in the interest of each player to let the other know that if he tries to 
mislead his expectations, he will himself fire back by misleading the other player’s 
expectations. Hence, a strong signal on the part of both players would reduce the duration 
of the possible conflict and therefore would reduce the volatility of the taxation rate. 
Pros and cons of tax harmonization versus taw competition can be evaluated. Free-
riding behaviors versus the need to deal with asymmetric shocks can also be weighted.   17 
   
 
Finally, static versus dynamic considerations shed light on the best institutional set up to 
deal with the tax system in the EMU. 
The theoretical analysis demonstrates the paramount importance of tax policy in 
Europe, and, more generally, in a monetary union. If tax competition exists, the 
mechanism driving to the stability of the system rests upon the importance of the signal 
given by both players.  If a country gives the signal that tax discipline is not its priority, 
the result can be a war of attrition. Conversely, if both countries signals their ability to 
enter a tax war, this war will not occur. The stability of the system will be maintained. 
One measure of this ability is the weighted average of all tax rates in a given country. The 
higher it is, the higher the probability that the country would not be able to carry on a war  
of attrition. Considering that process, it is of a paramount importance for a country to be 
able to give a strong signal to the other country that a war of attrition is possible. For that, 
countries must have sound public finances. If not, the signal given would be that the 
country could not engage into a war. The result would be a free riding strategy 
implemented by the strongest country. The proposed theoretical model reinforces Boss’ 
argument that the pressure on government expenditures helps to avoid waste and 
inefficiencies in the public sector. And that if countries have sound public finances, tax 
competition would not lead to a “race to the bottom”. 18 
 
APPENDIX 
With a very close finite horizon, the cooperative behavior (“dove”) is strongly 
dominated by the non-cooperative behavior (“hawk”) under both conditions : 
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u u , 
which leads to  ( )
2 1 2 b a - > . 
b<1 means a very low a. In this case, both players give more importance to the 
unemployment objective than to the stability of the tax rate. The only equilibrium for 
both players is hence not to cooperate and therefore to follow the “hawk” strategy : the 
(H, H) solution.  
When  ( )
2 1 2 b a - < , there exists two Nash equilibria : ( )




1 ,  and 
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1 , . The solution of this “chicken game” consists in playing the 
cooperation (see Espinosa-Vega and Yip (1994)).   19 
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